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 1 
THE FUTURE(S) OF RISK:  
BARTHES AND BAUDRILLARD GO TO HOLLYWOOD 
ABSTRACT 
Hollywood cinema is rarely acknowledged as an important counterpublic sphere 
which not only works to stimulate a critical and inclusive dialogue on the nature of 
risk technologies, but which also facilitates a deliberative engagement with the 
politics and ethics of risk-management.  And yet, it is commonplace for the futuristic 
films of the science fiction genre to take seriously the implications to `justice’ of 
intensified surveillance in liberal democratic societies faced with different kinds of 
risk.  Filmic representations of ‘imagined’ technologies for responding to crime, 
especially those based on identificatory and predictive capacity, are typified in box 
office successes, such as Minority Report (2002), Paycheck (2003) and A Scanner 
Darkly (2006).  These films may (simply) be entertaining as `action-packed’ science 
fiction thrillers, but they also create a Baudrillardian hyperreality which allows us to 
glimpse alternative frameworks of risk-management which, ambiguously, reflect both 
the horror and the hope for systems of `justice’, law enforcement and punishment in a 
`risk society’.  Through an analysis of these films, and drawing on Barthes’s notions 
of jouissance and the enigmatic, this paper explores the critical, subversive and 
disruptive possibilities of the simulated worlds of `Hollywood risk-management’ 
paying particular attention to how they work to destabilise and scrutinise the 
conceptual scope and empirical instantiation of `risk’ as well as challenge its ethico-
political meaning in contemporary life.  
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 2 
FROM RISK TO RESISTANCE 
In the academic and policy literature, the concept of risk organises and informs our 
perspectives on contemporary life, and is used not only as a mobile signifier of the 
quality of everyday experience in the present, but also as a means of contemplating 
and planning for the dynamics of the future.  There is now a large body of theoretical 
scholarship and scientific research which provides a wide range of sophisticated, 
complex and generally persuasive analyses of the different hazards we face, and the 
potentialities of a future blighted by environmental, political, economic and social 
insecurities (Giddens, 1990, 1991; Beck, 1992; Bauman, 1997).  Indeed, Giddens’s 
(1984) overworked notion of ‘ontological insecurity’ is frequently used as shorthand 
to describe the uncertainties of life in late modernity.  While there is much to support 
this gloomy outlook, the rhetoric of a runaway world and its accompanying narratives 
of precariousness, risk, threat and fear sustains an affective register of concern, and a  
receptivity to strategies and technologies which can be fashioned and developed in the 
name of risk management.  Such a context provides fertile ground for popularising 
and giving credence to certain narrowly conceived approaches to the containment and 
management of risk, most especially in relation to the surveillance and regulation of 
predatory, dangerous and prolific forms of criminality.   
 
Across Western liberal democratic societies, risk analysis, both as a process of inquiry 
and an apparatus of quantitative, actuarial reasoning has become the dominant 
procedure used to predict behaviour and situate individuals according to the level of 
risk they pose (Feeley and Simon, 1992; Kelmshall, 2003).  Indeed, since the 
publication of Feeley’s and Simon’s (1992) seminal article on the ‘new penology’, 
criminological scholarship has been swift to comment on how modes of calculation 
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and control associated with risk-oriented technologies and actuarial practices have 
infiltrated and become de rigeur within criminal justice and penal administration. At 
times made meaningful within wider perspectives on neo-liberalism (O’Malley, 
2004a; Stenson, 2000), and at other times investigated in relation to specific areas of 
policy and practice – see, for example, Stenson and Sullivan (2001) - there now exists 
a substantial critical literature documenting not only the power effects of ‘risk 
discourse’, but also how thorny questions of governance, legitimacy, human rights, 
punishment, law enforcement, justice and community safety are increasingly settled 
by reference to the notion of ‘risk’    
 
This kind of critical work provides an important counterpoint to (atheoretical) 
evaluation studies which focus almost exclusively on the administrative utility and 
instrumental value of different ‘risk technologies’.  Widely condemned as ‘positivist 
correctionalism and managerialism’ (Pratt, 1997: 4), the majority of these 
contributions have been concerned with developing and perfecting different 
technologies and apparatuses for identifying, managing, measuring, calculating and 
predicting risk (Hoge, 2002; Webster, MacDonald and Simpson, 2006).  At best, they 
provide negative, rather than critical assessments of the effectiveness, efficiency 
and/or predictive utility of risk technologies; at worst, they leave in place how ‘risk’ 
should be thought, analysed, managed and communicated in any given politico-
economic context. However, and of concern here is how critical scholarship and 
administrative work alike make a number of unqualified assumptions about the 
popular (public) appetite and support for risk-oriented modes of governance.  In his 
outline of the resonance of fear of crime to the contemporary politics of risk, Jackson 
posits: 
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Anxieties about crime make themselves felt through public demands on the police to 
manage crime and its concomitant causes and effects.  Clamor for more police, 
increasing calls for the government to tackle antisocial behaviour, the seeming refusal 
of many people to believe that crime rates are not rising – all these evidence the 
influence of public perceptions of risk.  And governments respond: witness popular 
punitive law and order sloganeering (and) police strategies of reassurance…..  In some 
instances, public perceptions of risk even encourage the police to focus on reassurance 
at the expense of actual risk reduction (2006: 253). 
 
The idea of a compliant public which is not only receptive to the introduction of 
authoritarian risk-reduction strategies, but which also welcomes the widespread use of 
pseudo-scientific instruments and tools of risk-management, runs through much of the 
academic commentary on ‘risk’.  There is a tacit assumption that the public is not 
merely convinced of the utility of risk technologies, but actively clamours for more of 
the same – see, for example, Ashenden’s (2002) eloquent and insightful article on 
‘policing perversion’, in which she examines the ‘normalising models of risk’ which 
inform popular acceptance of the perceived threat posed by child sex offenders. What 
is missing from such accounts is any acknowledgement of the circulation of a ‘risk 
discourse’ which is resistant to or, at least, which problematises, challenges and/or 
subverts hegemonic ideas about the systems and apparatuses of risk control and their 
anticipated effects.  I want to suggest three key and interrelated reasons for this 
omission.  First, the literature tends to hold a rather limited (and limiting), one-
dimensional view of the nature of public opinion and the orientation of public 
deliberation; second, there is very little imagination about the range of media through 
which ‘risk discourse’ circulates, or what counts as the public sphere; and third, 
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academic scholarship, despite its critical credentials, is rather conservative about what 
it regards as, and where it locates relations and practices of resistance.   
 
Elsewhere, I have raised concern about criminology’s tendency to characterise (or 
even caricature) public opinion as reactionary and punitive (Campbell, 2008).  
According to Lyons and Scheingold (2000), understanding community engagements 
with questions of crime and punishment through the lens of ‘punitive populism’ 
(Bottoms, 1995) has become something of a cumulative enterprise within academic 
criminology.  Getting to analytical grips with the (re-)emergence of populism and its 
presumed support for the reintroduction of harsh measures premised on retribution, 
deterrence and incapacitation, has produced some very innovative accounts of the 
resurgence of a more conservative, authoritarian penality which is open to the 
proliferating (and often unregulated) use of risk-centred surveillance and control 
systems such as CCTV, biometric identification methods, psychometric testing, 
screening and scanning devices, offender profiling, drugs and alcohol testing 
procedures and sex offender registers (Lyon, 2006; Thomas, 2005; McCartney, 2006).  
At the same time, the term ‘punitiveness normally carries connotations of excess’ 
(Matthews, 2005: 179) in the penal realm, and when articulated in conjunction with 
‘populism’ the effect is to discredit the value of public deliberations about risk and its 
management.  Indeed, it is not uncommon for public dialogue to be summarily 
dismissed as rhetorical, hyperbolic, unreasonable, irrational, paranoid, hysterical and 
atavistic (Anderson, 1995).  However, there is a growing chorus of voices which 
question whether the expression ‘the new punitiveness’, or the notion of `punitive 
populism’ adequately describes the public mood and tolerance for intrusive, panoptic 
forms of risk-management (O’Malley, 1999; Matthews, 2005).  Indeed, Hutton (2005) 
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questions the notion of a monolithic public disposition and presents empirical data to 
demonstrate that punitive attitudes co-exist with less visceral and more ‘rational’, 
reflective attitudes to the politics of risk - see also Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur and 
Hough (2003); while Sparks calls for a highly contextualised and situationally-
specific appreciation of popular views: 
 
… the reception by people of media stories about crime and punishment is best 
grasped ethnographically and in situ, in which case many public responses that are 
commonly deprecated by criminologists and others as ‘irrational’ or ‘hysterical’ tend 
to become substantially more intelligible (2001: 197). 
 
Sparks’s reference to the mediated nature of public discourse on ‘risk’ also prompts 
us to question what we come to regard as ‘media’ in this context.  It is commonplace, 
for example, to cite newspaper coverage as the source media of public consciousness 
about the risks posed by crime, most especially the sensationalist reports of the tabloid 
press. Even those accounts which explicitly examine ‘media representations’ of risk, 
disproportionately trawl the newspapers for data (Ashenden, 2002; Meyer, 2007) 
rather than any other medium.  It is not that this is ‘wrong’ so much that it ultimately 
skews and narrows our understanding of ‘media’ and, more importantly, it limits our 
sense of what counts as the public sphere of ‘risk discourse’.  Recent developments in 
public sphere theory call into question Habermasian notions of the nature of public 
deliberation and mediated dialogue.  Habermas’s insistence on the nature of public 
discussion – as a rule-based, ideal speech situation; as informed by communicative 
rationality; and as achieving consensus based on universal norms and principles –
expose him to the charge of failing to recognise the exclusivity of his particular 
version of discourse ethics (Benhabib, 1986; Calhoun, 1992; Outhwaite, 1994; 
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Crossley and Roberts, 2004).  Discursive media and practices which do not conform 
to the formalism of Habermasian criteria are either rendered irrelevant to deliberative 
forms of political engagement; or, are excluded and silenced as instances of public 
dialogue.  Such discursive spaces have been theorised as counterpublic spheres (Asen, 
2000; Asen and Brouwer, 2001; Warner, 2002) and this is a concept which allows an 
understanding of public deliberation (of risk in this context) as mobilised discursively 
within and through a heterogeneity of cultural media.  Consequently, stand-up 
comedy, Hollywood film, television talk shows, video-gaming and cartoons, for 
example, are as crucial for deliberative and participatory engagement with the politics 
of risk as are government publications, documentary broadcasts, citizens juries, town 
hall meetings, local surveys and consensus conferences.  Such media function as 
discursive spaces of ‘critical publicity’ (Asen and Brouwer, 2001: 6), a notion which 
denotes the reflexive interaction of resistance and power as a discursive and cultural 
accomplishment.    
 
These kinds of insights also allow us to be a little more imaginative about the nature 
of resistance, and where relations and practices of resistance might be located.  With 
the exception of cultural criminological scholarship (Hayward, 2004; Ferrell, 
Hayward and Young, 2008), ‘conventional criminologies of risk’ tend to recognise 
resistance only if it comes in the form of direct action which has the effect of 
scuppering or problematising the exercise of governmental power.  So long as 
resistance is equated with direct forms of action which have a demonstrable, political 
impact on how risk is communicated and governed, it will obscure the more subtle 
ways in which contemporary modes of risk-management come to be questioned, 
reflected upon and challenged as part of an everyday, ongoing and revisable 
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consciousness of ‘risk’.  In other words, relations of resistance inhere in what 
Connolly talks of as a ‘movement of becoming’ (1999: 57-62), a point at which we 
might engage with forms of critical publicity and counterdiscourses of ‘risk’ in a way 
which incites an ‘ethos of critical responsiveness’ (op cit: 62; see also, Campbell, 
2009 in press).  Such an ethos is experienced as a dynamic process of sensibility-
formation which involves a disruptive reflexivity about our own and others’ beliefs 
about ‘risk’ and how it is currently managed.  This kind of subjective and 
intersubjective resistance may not be visually dramatic (or even materially effective) 
but it unsettles and contests the terms and conditions of the received wisdom of ‘risk’, 
exposing its ambiguities and uncertainties, and leaving it vulnerable to change.  
 
Kemshall is right to suggest that ‘(t)he identification, assessment, prevention and 
management of risk have become big business in crime policy, practice and research’ 
(2003: 1: my emphasis).  However, the hegemony of a ‘risk-based’ approach to 
criminal justice matters does not also mean that such strategies are popularly 
supported, or actively demanded from below.  Yet, the existence of a ‘mass risk 
consciousness’ (O’Malley, 2004b: 185) is continually asserted as though it were the 
mainspring of the strategic direction of contemporary crime control.  It is certainly 
common for politicians to present legislative or policy change in terms of being 
responsive to public concern about risk - and this is especially evident in relation to 
the management of serious sexual and violent offenders (Kemshall and Maguire, 
2001; Ashenden, 2002).  If we agree with Ryan (2005) that the rise of the public 
voice(s) within the national and local politics of risk democratizes the policy-making 
process, then it is clearly important to ensure that such voices are heard in their 
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complexity and diversity, rather than assumed to be all singing from the same hymn 
sheet.  
 
HYPERREALITIES OF ‘RISK’  
Hollywood cinema is rarely acknowledged as an important counterpublic sphere 
which works firstly, to stimulate a critical and inclusive dialogue on the nature of risk 
of/from crime; and secondly, to facilitate a deliberative engagement with the politics 
and ethics of ‘risk-management’.  There is, of course, an extensive criminological 
literature which critically examines the cultural politics of Hollywood film and how it 
might be read/viewed as an important site of resistance, contestation and 
confrontation (Rafter, 2000; Mason, 2003; Valverde, 2006).  As O’Brien et al note: 
 
Rather than understanding Hollywood movies simply as vehicles for disseminating 
conventional mores, we suggest that they can furnish critical (and complex) points of 
view on law and crime (2005a: 17). 
 
However, this critical scholarship tends to privilege the kinds of representational 
approaches to power, communication and resistance associated with the Birmingham 
School (Hall, 1997); or the ideological criticism exemplified by structuralist 
approaches to literary and cultural studies – see, especially Carrabine (2008,); or 
schematic models of cultural analysis exemplified in Valverde’s (2006) use of social 
semiotics.  To be sure, this literature offers valuable insights into the cultural 
meanings of Hollywood film (O’Brien et al, 2005b), and suggests that ‘crime films’ 
provide a useful social and political commentary on contemporary events 
(McLaughlin, 2005).  However, while much of this work acknowledges the vicarious 
pleasures and fascinations of viewing, it invariably positions such analyses within a 
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frame of reference concerned with ‘effects’ rather than ‘existential experience’.  In 
short, there is an organising epistemological commitment to structuralism where the 
relationship between viewer, film and socio-cultural context can appear too 
mechanistic, periodised and reductionist to capture the instabilities and uncertainties 
of cinematic meaning-making. What is proposed here, then, is an approach to 
Hollywood cinema which contributes to criminological work on film in three key 
ways.   
 
First, and following Valverde (2006: 11), I want to cast off the sub-discipline of 
‘crime and the media’ from its criminological moorings, without losing sight of the 
discipline’s core philosophical interests in the nature of justice, rights, legitimacy and 
social order.  I do this by suggesting that we should be relatively open to what counts 
as a ‘crime film’ and not artificially restrict this to ‘films that focus primarily on crime 
and its consequences’ (Rafter, 2000: 5 Original emphasis).  Secondly, I want to bring 
to the analysis a greater sense of the ‘disturbing pleasures’ of viewing.  For example, 
in summary of Rafter’s Shots in the Mirror, an anonymous reviewer writes that `crime 
films …. provide a safe space for fantasies of rebellion, punishment and the 
restoration of order’ (2000: back cover: my emphasis).  Rather than safety, I propose a 
viewing position which is altogether more unsettling and ontologically disruptive.  
Thirdly, I want to read Hollywood film with a poststructuralist inflection which 
moves beyond questions of representation, ideology and effects and foregrounds the 
worlds of simulation, affect and experience.   
 
In recent years, particularly through the work of poststructuralist and/or feminist 
theorists, the genre of science fiction film (and also that of horror) has been described 
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as the paradigmatic form of reflexive and destabilising cultural experiences (Creed, 
1993; McGuigan, 1999: 80-85; Dimitrakaki and Tsiantis, 2002; O’Riordan, 2008).  
Such a status is designated by its subject matter, most especially the recurring 
references to a dystopian future, alien life forms, apocalyptic scenarios and temporal 
dislocations. But whereas most authors regard science fiction as speculative fantasy, 
often incorporating imaginative elements which have no existence in our present 
reality, Baudrillard complains that the distinction between film and reality is no 
longer apparent - ‘life is cinema’, he proclaims in America (1986/1988:101).  From 
this standpoint, the task of science fiction is not a phantasmagorical one, but is: 
 
 ….  to put decentred situations, models of simulation in place and to contrive to give 
them the feeling of the real, of the banal, of lived experience, to reinvent the real as 
fiction, precisely because it has disappeared from our own life.  Hallucination of the 
real, of lived experience, of the quotidian, but reconstituted, sometimes down to 
disquietingly strange details …. Brought to life with a transparent precision, but 
without substance, derealized in advance, hyperrealised (Baudrillard, 1981/1994: 
124). 
 
There is no need to take Baudrillard literally, or to accept his theory of the ‘precession 
of simulacra’ (Baudrillard, 1981/1994: 1-42) in its entirety to appreciate the point he 
is making here.  That is, if all life is a fiction, we can accept the proposition that the 
difference between how we narrate our everyday experiences of living in a ‘risk 
society’, and how such experiences are narrated through Hollywood film, is a 
question of form rather than content.  Indeed, the potential of the cinematographic 
form of a blockbuster science fiction movie lies not only in its capacity to produce 
perfect (and spectacular) simulations of extant, everyday ‘realities’ of risk and crime, 
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but also to render those ‘realities’ as troubling and strange.  There is no guarantee here 
of a ‘safe encounter’ with the cinematic spectacle so much as an experience of 
realisation that all limits no longer apply and have already been exceeded.  As 
Baudrillard might put it, the catastrophe has already happened.  It is in the fleeting 
moment of realisation, that a ‘critical responsiveness’ to other possibilities for 
thinking about our present condition, is initiated.  
 
Baudrillard proposes a theoretical framework for conceptualising science fiction film 
as a hyperrealised simulacrum of our everyday life in the ‘risk society’.  However, as 
Merrin (2005: 151) notes, Baudrillard has no dialogue with alternative theories of 
media, and he does not reference models of communication and, in particular, theories 
of the active reception of media products.  In short, he cannot account for the 
continuing popularity of the genre given its propensity to disrupt our sense of 
ontological security.  Baudrillard’s lack of analytical interest in media receptivity is 
all the more surprising given his debt to Barthesian semiology.  This is not the place 
to elaborate either the influence of Barthes on Baudrillard’s work, or Barthes’s 
cultural theories as a generic whole – see, for example, Merrin (2005) and Culler 
(2001) respectively.  However, Barthes’s concepts of jouissance and the enigmatic are 
relevant here.  In The Pleasure of the Text (1973/1990), Barthes sets out what Howard 
describes as an ‘erotics of reading’ (1973/1990: xviii); it is a thesis which talks of the 
pleasure and jouissance (bliss) of our textual encounters.  The text of  pleasure brings 
comfort and contentment to the reader/viewer by virtue of its stable perspective and 
conventional narrative form; in Barthes’s words, ‘(it is) the text that comes from 
culture and does not break with it, (it) is linked to a comfortable practice of reading’ 
(1973/1990: 14: Original emphasis).  In terms of science fiction film, such pleasure 
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might come from ‘feel-good’ sci-fi such as ET: The Extra Terrestrial (1982), 
Bicentennial Man (1999) or Artificial Intelligence: AI (2001); or ‘happy-ever-after’ 
sci-fi disaster movies such as Independence Day (1996), Armageddon (1998), and The 
Day After Tomorrow (2004).  However, for the most part, the genre is defined by its 
apocalyptic and sinister narratives which not only pose questions about humanity’s 
place in the scheme of things, but which also create a dystopic view of the world 
which always-already appears grim, threatening, unnerving and dangerous – such as A 
Clockwork Orange (1971), Nineteen Eighty-Four (1984) or Twelve Monkeys (1995).  
For Telotte, the stuff of science fiction film ‘… typically focuses our attention on 
borders: the borders of our knowledge, those of our experience, those that separate us 
from …. “nature”’ (2001: 197).  Such films are more likely, then, to induce jouissance 
amongst their viewers.  For Barthes these are ‘texts of bliss’: 
 
 … the text that imposes a state of loss, the text that discomforts … unsettles the 
reader’s historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, 
values, memories, brings to a crisis his (sic) relation with language’ (1973/1990: 14).  
 
In an earlier work, S/Z ([1970/1975), Barthes outlines a framework for understanding 
narrative conventions, how these structure reading practices and sustain the dialectical 
relationship between text and reader – a process which Howard describes as the 
‘poetics of reading’ (1970/1975: vii).  Introduced in this work, and of relevance to this 
discussion, is Barthes’s notion of the enigmatic. Barthes posits the presence, in any 
given narrative, of a hermeneutic code, a sequence of enigmas, paradoxes and puzzles 
which not only pose and formulate questions, but which also function to retard, 
equivocate on, evade and denounce answers.  From this vantage point, it is easy to 
recognise how science fiction narratives – as might be argued of all narratives - are 
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characteristically punctuated by multiple enigmas which continually postpone the 
moment of closure, certainty and narrative resolution.  Put another way, the 
‘enigmatic’ is that aspect of narrative which induces jouissance and prompts a 
disruptive reflexivity about the ways things are.  
 
In the light of these methodological insights, I want to suggest that our consumption 
of science fiction films is an experience of jouissance involving a series of encounters 
with the enigmatic. In the next section I explore this proposition through the lens of 
three contemporary science fiction films – Minority Report (2002), Paycheck (2003) 
and A Scanner Darkly (2006).  These films are adaptations of Philip K Dick’s short 
stories (Paycheck [1953]; Minority Report [1956]; and auto-biographical novel (A 
Scanner Darkly [1977]).  These are not ‘crime texts’ in any conventional sense, but 
are narratives woven around themes of inter alia authoritarianism, parallel universes, 
alternative histories, transcendental experience, monopoly capital and trust in 
government.  Moreover, there is a degree of artistic licence in the transformation of 
Dick’s stories and their cinematic re-articulation as contemporaneous myths which 
may have no correspondence with Dick’s own political and philosophical concerns.  
Furthermore, there will always be something lost in an analysis which reads these 
texts through a single thematic, in this instance as narratives of risk, its management 
and associated technologies. With these caveats, the paper goes on to explore the 
critical, subversive and disruptive possibilities of the simulated worlds of `Hollywood 
risk-management’ paying particular attention to how they work to destabilise and 
scrutinise the conceptual scope and empirical instantiation of `risk’ as well as 
challenge its ethico-political meaning in contemporary life.  
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THE FUTURE PRESENT 
The adjective most commonly used to describe science fiction as a film (or literary) 
genre, is that it is ‘futuristic’.  While I do not dispute this description, it can obscure 
more than it illuminates about the temporal horizons of sci-fi narratives.  Films 
invariably open with a reference to the temporal context in which the action is taking 
place, and this ranges from specific dates – such as ‘2054’ (Minority Report, 2002) 
and ‘1995’ (A Clockwork Orange, 1971) – to something more vague and open – such 
as ‘seven years from now’ (A Scanner Darkly, 2006), and ‘in the near future’ (V for 
Vendetta, 2005).  In these cinematic futures, we are introduced to a wide range of 
‘fanciful’ technologies which have different capabilities in terms of managing, 
reducing or eliminating risk.  In Paycheck (2003), for example, we encounter not only 
a laser-enhanced lens which allows the user to see around the curvature of the earth, 
and thus, into the future, but also digital and biological procedures for erasing 
memory.  Minority Report (2002) features an elaborate system of intelligence-led 
policing based on the harnessed powers of human pre-cognition; while A Scanner 
Darkly (2006) opens with a press conference which explains the value to intensive, 
undercover surveillance of a high-tech scramble-suit which disguises every aspect of 
the wearer’s appearance.  These technologies certainly appeal to our imagination and 
fantasies of future ‘realities’, or at least, ‘potentialities’ in the field of ‘risk-
management’, but they are also grounded in present day technological capabilities.  In 
his review of sci-fi films since the 1960s, Larson (2008) finds that depictions of 
computer technologies tend to mirror real-world developments and trends.  He draws 
inspiration from Edmund Burke’s (1759/1992) observation that ‘… the power of the 
imagination is incapable of producing anything absolutely new; it can only vary the 
disposition of those ideas which it has received from the senses’ (Burke, 1759/1992: 
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301 cited in Larson, 2008: 294). But whereas Larson uses this insight as an hypothesis 
to be tested, Burke’s reference to the relationship between imagination and 
disposition is more instructive here.  That is, alongside the more ‘fanciful’ 
technologies – the most elaborate of which facilitate time travel (Timecop, 1994; 
Total Recall, 1990) - sci-fi films are resplendent with actually-existing gadgetry and 
computer-assisted security practices. The use of smartcards, retinal/iris scanning, 
biometric identification systems, voice authorisation devices, palm print activation 
locks, miniature camcorder surveillance, holograms/holographics and LCD monitors 
invite the viewer to experience a veritable ‘gauntlet of cybersecurity’ (Nellis, 2005: 
71) which, though instantly recognisable, may appear to be disturbingly strange.  In 
other words, it is not our imagination about risk technologies which is being 
stimulated, but our disposition to the potential scope and impact of their uses.  
Consider some of the promotional taglines:  
 
What would you do if you were accused of a murder you had not committed ….. yet?  
The future can be seen.  Murder can be prevented. The guilty punished before the 
crime is committed.  The system is perfect.  It’s never wrong until it comes after you 
(Minority Report, 2002). 
 
Big Brother is watching you (Nineteen Eighty Four, 1984). 
 
What does a scanner see? Everything is not going to be OK (A Scanner Darkly, 2006). 
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Through their taglines, trailers and publicity material, Hollywood sci-fi not only 
entices viewers with a series of enigmas about the nature of ‘justice’ in the ‘risk 
society’, but also poses questions about the language, ethics, politics and boundaries 
of hi-tech security systems and the technologies upon which they rely.  Science fiction 
cinema permits viewers to glance at a strange yet familiar ‘risk landscape’ of future 
possibilities which are always-already embedded in present realities.  Ott (2007) 
reminds us that the ‘glance’, unlike the ‘gaze’, engages viewers on an emotionally-
embodied level rather than on a rational, cognitive basis.  As Romanyshyn puts it, the 
cinematic glance is ‘an emotional vision, a vision that is moved at a bodily level’ 
(1993: 341). To watch sci-fi films, then, is to experience jouissance as a destabilising 
realisation that all is not quite what it seems.  
 
THE LANGUAGE AND RHETORIC OF SCIENTISM  
The notion of risk ‘has deep roots in the history of science’ (Horlick-Jones, 1998: 84 
cited in Kemshall, 2003: 49-50), and is ‘embedded in empiricism, scientific canons of 
proof, probabilistic thinking, and a realist epistemology’ (Kemshall, 2003: 50). 
Consequently, the language of risk is infused with pseudo-scientific concepts such 
that the utility and value of different risk technologies and procedures comes to be 
seen in abstract, almost technical terms.  Whether in the form of a risk assessment 
tool, a surveillance device or an identificatory technique, the impact and effectiveness 
of ‘risk technologies’ is often read off from the reliability, systematicity, predictive 
capacity and/or accuracy of the ‘hardware’.  This is the kind of commentary which 
accompanies our introduction to the ground-breaking technology of Washington, 
DC’s Pre-Crime Unit featured in Minority Report (2002).  The film opens with a 
series of sequences which showcase the predictive capabilities of the ‘pre-cogs’.  A 
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series of black and white images of a murder in progress are flashed across the screen, 
and we witness the gory and horrific event as though it takes place in a dream.  This is 
no dream, but the view of the future as seen through the ‘mind’s eye’ of the ‘pre-cog’, 
Agatha, one of three psychic ‘humanoids’ who are kept floating in a translucent, 
nutrient substance in a security-protected chamber.  Her ‘pre-cognition’ is translated 
and made readable through a ball and shute system which delivers the names of the 
victims and killer, and marks the start of an intelligence-led and highly efficient police 
investigation which apprehends the  murderer before he has had chance to kill.  What 
is significant here, is how far the operational environment of the ‘pre-cogs’ 
technology is explicitly represented as pristine and sterile with all of the 
accoutrements and trappings of a hi-tech facility complete with robotics, pulsating 
lights, electronic probes, steel, glass, remote controls and LCD displays.  This is 
further buttressed by the presence of a white-coated technician who is tasked with the 
continual monitoring and checking of the ‘pre-cogs’ to ensure not only their 
maximum efficiency but also that there is no contamination or interference with their 
functioning in the service of ‘justice’.  As Chief Anderton (Tom Cruise) is quick to 
point out, ‘it’s better if you don’t think of them as human ….. pre-cogs are pattern 
recognition filters, that’s all’.  These signifiers reinforce the scientificity of the ‘pre-
cog’ technology and invite viewers to accept its ideological credentials as a neutral, 
dispassionate and infallible system of risk management which, importantly, is not 
susceptible to the frailties and contingencies of the human condition.   
 
However, Minority Report centres on a narrative which foregrounds the jouissance of 
the imperfection of perfection (the innocence of the guilty, the humanity of the 
dehumanised, and the mistrust of the trustworthy).  Indeed, the title of the film refers 
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to the production of a report which documents those occasions when the ‘pre-cogs’ 
disagree about the predicted future.  In an exchange between Anderton and Dr Iris 
Hineman (Lois Smith), the scientist responsible for the development of ‘pre-cog’ 
technology, they ruminate the implications to ‘justice’ of a flawed system: 
 
Dr Hineman: These minority reports are destroyed the instant they occur …. 
Obviously for pre-crime to function there can’t be any suggestion of fallibility.  After 
all, who wants a justice system that instils doubt.   
 
However, it is the character, Danny Whitwer (Colin Farrell), sent by the US Attorney-
General to assess the work of the Pre-Crime Unit, who recognises that technology is 
never devoid of human involvement.  In a very instructive sequence where he is given 
a tour of the security chamber, he questions the trust placed in the infallibility of the 
‘pre-cog’ system, is sceptical of the hegemony of scientism, and is critical of what he 
regards as the deification of risk technologies: 
 
Science has stolen most of our miracles…..  In a way they (the ‘pre-cogs’) give us 
hope.  Hope of the existence of the divine.  I find it interesting that some people have 
begun to deify the pre-cogs…..  You call this room the ‘temple’ …. The oracle isn’t 
where the power is anyway.  The power has always been with the priests …..  If 
there’s a flaw, it’s human, it always is. 
 
This interjection prompts the realisation that the promise of predictive crime 
prevention delivered through a reliable, value-neutral and abstract risk technology 
may be merely a powerful rhetoric which masks its human-made flaws and inherent 
fallibilities, as well as the politics of its use.  As O’Malley has argued very 
 20 
persuasively, risk is never technically neutral and, ‘(i)n particular, …. (it) is always 
shaped and given effect by specific social and political rationales and environments’ 
(2008: 453).  
 
‘RISK’ AS A POLITICO-ETHICAL RELATIONSHIP 
Cinema-goers, as any other section of the population, are familiar with contemporary 
initiatives in crime reduction and public protection, even if they do not appreciate 
some of the more nuanced aspects of their development.  There is a common-sense 
acceptability of managing the risk posed by dangerous, anti-social and persistent 
offenders but, as Kemshall and Maguire suggest, even when such management raises 
serious ethical questions about human rights, the rule of law or accountability, ‘(t)he 
process is self-justificatory and difficult to challenge without appearing to “side with” 
a highly unpopular group of people’ (2001: 258).  However, the narrative economies 
of science fiction films permit viewers to glimpse and ponder the politico-ethical 
dilemmas of risk management practices in ways which seem to be absent from 
everyday discourse. 
 
A Scanner Darkly (2006), for example, is set within the context of a ‘war on drugs’.  
At a time, ‘seven years from now’, 20% of the population are hooked on the highly 
addictive and debilitating, illegal drug, Substance D, made from a small blue flower.  
In response to this ‘culture of addiction’, the government develops an invasive, high-
tech surveillance system which relies on a network of informants and undercover 
agents.  Several sequences in the film which represent this surveillance at work, raise 
questions about the ethics of such practices in terms of civil liberties, social justice 
and individual rights.  As Lyon (2002) has argued, most people assume (wrongly) that 
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the ‘respectable, law-abiding majority’  have a ‘right’ to their privacy, and also that 
‘the innocent’ have nothing to fear from a surveillance-based society.  To be sure, 
critical scholarship has been swift to document the politico-ethical implications of the 
unrestrained and unregulated spread of surveillance technology – see, for example, 
Lyon, 2003 – but McCartney contends that ‘normative constraints are not yet proving 
sufficient to restrain policy which prioritises risk aversion above human rights and 
justice for all members of society’ (2006: 129).  As the story unfolds, viewers of A 
Scanner Darkly are invited to reflect on the ethicality of risk management, and to 
balance the need for security and freedom through the lens of the protagonist’s story; 
as the DVD plot summary puts it, ‘(t)he story: a twisted funny tale of people hooked 
on Substance D. And of a government that cheerfully destroys its citizens – their 
rights, their relationships – in order to save them’. 
 
Bob Arctor (Keanu Reeves) is the undercover agent assigned to immerse himself in 
the drug underworld and infiltrate the drug supply chain.  We follow Arctor’s 
undercover journey as an experience of increasing paranoia and confusion concerning 
his identity, as he becomes addicted to Substance D and no longer able to function 
effectively.  However, the viewer is free to ponder whether it is Substance D, or 
whether it is the nature of an intensive ‘surveillance society’ which induces these 
destabilising effects.  For example, Arctor’s housemates, though heavy drug-users, are 
convinced (and justifiably so) that the police have bugged their home and are 
watching their every move.  Moreover, Arctor’s roommate, Barris (Robert Downey 
Jr), suspects that Arctor (and his girlfriend) are part of a terrorist organisation, and he 
secretly reports them to the police.  Through a variety of sub-plots, some of which 
provide the most memorable comedic interludes, a sense of the pervasiveness of 
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surveillance and the compulsion to spy even on one’s friends and neighbours, is 
played out throughout the film.  As Linklater commented: ‘The meaning of the film is 
embedded right here.  Authority itself is ominpresent’ (DVD [2006] : Special 
Features).  
 
However, it is the twist in the tale which provokes our ethical curiosity.  Our concern 
for Arctor’s addiction and his decline into paranoia, deflects our attention away from 
the ‘bigger picture’ which is revealed toward the end of the film.  That is, Arctor’s 
descent into a drug-fuelled insanity had been intended; it was a carefully conceived 
police operation to enable them to infiltrate New Path, a global corporation which not 
only held the monopoly of drug rehabilitative work but which also sponsored a wide 
range of risk-management and policing programmes relating to drug-use reduction. 
Thus, selected without his knowledge or consent, Arctor was sacrificed so that he 
could enter New Path unnoticed as a genuine addict. Some film critics have 
complained that A Scanner Darkly suffers from an ‘inability to draw in the viewer’, is 
‘not involving on an emotional level’ and is ‘well-trodden’ (Berardinelli, 2006). Yet 
others have suggested that ‘the brilliance of the film is how it suggests, without 
bombast or fanfare, the ways in which the real world has come to resemble the dark 
world of comic books’ (Chocano, 2006). It is not my aim here to pronounce on the 
filmic merits (or otherwise) of A Scanner Darkly, but I would agree with both of these 
film reviews.  On the one hand, the narrative twist which reveals the mass deception 
of an ‘authority of trust’ (whether in the form of a corporation, a government , an 
institution or a body of experts) is a conventional plot device used to conclude the 
story and explain its mysteries – for example, Planet of the Apes (1968); Soylent 
Green (1973). In this sense, Berardinelli is right to complain of the use of the 
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‘narrative twist’ in A Scanner Darkly as being ‘well-trodden’.  However, such twists 
in the tale vary from film to film and therefore rupture quite different myths about the 
ethics of risk management, the politics of authority and the nature of trust.  We can, 
therefore, also agree with Chocano and recognise that it is in the particular context of 
a ‘war on drugs’ (rather than any other sort of risk-producing context), that A Scanner 
Darkly identifies a number of key and specific ethical and political dilemmas.  First, it 
prompts viewers to question the ethicality of certain kinds of risk governance, most 
especially to problematise the means-ends justifications for the use of covert 
techniques and approaches. Second, it asks us to reconsider how surveillance 
functions not only to alter relations between citizens, but also to reconfigure the 
relationship between citizens and state.  Third, through the narrative device of the 
‘twist’ comes the abrupt realisation of the possibility of institutional complicity in 
generating the very risk it is tasked to manage.   
 
BLURRING THE BOUNDARIES  
Another way of talking about the dispersal and reversal of authority over risk-
management, as discussed above, is to suggest that simplistic dichotomies concerning 
the guilty/innocent, offender/victim, public/private, risk/protection can be 
reconfigured in a science fiction narrative.  As Keanu Reeves commented about A 
Scanner Darkly, ‘the lines between criminals and police are blurred’ (DVD [2006]: 
Special Features).  For example, in Minority Report, we enjoy a cinematic shopping 
experience where shoppers’ movement through a mall initiates personalised greetings 
and purchasing hints, all activated through the omnipresent technology of iris 
scanning.  Chief Anderton, now being pursued by his own officers, and having had 
his eyes surgically replaced by a backstreet opthalmist, has entered a retail complex to 
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purchase clothes for the abducted ‘pre-cog’, Agatha.  As he runs through the mall, we 
hear an accompanying commentary: ‘Hello Mr Yakomoto.  Welcome back to the 
Gap.  How did the assorted tank tops work out for you?’ - to which Anderton mutters, 
‘Mr Yakomoto?’.  While this sequence provides a little light relief to a very tense 
drama, it nonetheless makes two key points.  The first is that the technologies of 
biometric identification can be circumvented.  While there is clearly a degree of 
unalterability of the body parts or tissues which form the basis for unique 
identification – such as fingerprints, DNA, iris and retinal patterning - there remains 
the possibility of their transferability to another party.  Secondly, the sequence makes 
the important point that databases are fluid, shareable entities and cannot be fixed in 
space and time according to logic of ownership and accountability (Castells, 2000, 
2001).  In this example, the database which supports iris scanning for risk 
management/security purposes on the underground metro system, is transportable and 
communicated to other contexts to meet other ends – in this instance, re-usable as a 
biometrically-activated personal shopping service.  
 
While the example of the personalised shopping service is relatively benign, other 
instances concerning the collection, storage, retrieval and/or access to different kinds 
of data blur the boundaries of public/private concerns and responsibilities.  For 
example, in A Scanner Darkly personalised and biometric data is shareable and 
interactively used across both statutory and corporate sectors.  Given the narrative 
twist (discussed above), this turns out to be a rather sinister development.   
 
Academics, ‘paranoid survivalists’, right-wing libertarians and liberals alike, warn of 
the dangers of database expansion by the state sector.  Repeated references to  cross-
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sectoral access to personalised intelligence, across different films, reminds viewers of 
the fragility of ‘protective controls’ and the improbability of (totally) ‘secure data 
systems’. For example, in Paycheck, we discover that a disaffected government 
physicist working on a classified project in the weapons division, sold the design to 
the private corporation, Allcom.  He is subsequently killed for his efforts, and the 
services of Michael Jennings (Ben Affleck), a reverse engineer, are called upon to 
reconfigure the technology so that it functions even more efficiently – in this case, to 
see into the future.  ‘Risk technology’ in this film is represented as a commodity 
which can be bought and sold, deconstructed and reconstructed, sabotaged and stolen.  
While the plot centres on the power struggle over the creation and destruction of an 
awesome, risk-predictive laser technology, along the way Jennings sidesteps and 
overcomes a range of high-tech security controls.  For example, he uses a dollar bill to 
jam a security panel; he plants a bug in the computer system to disable it; and he gains 
entry to a high-security lab by stealing an electronic keycard.  Moreover, all of this 
takes place in full view of a government which is left rather helpless in the face of a 
powerful corporation and a skilful engineer.  In the sequence where Jennings is 
interrogated by the FBI, the US Attorney-General has reminded the agents that 
‘Michael Jennings’s cooperation is a matter of national security’, implying that the 
future of an entire nation boils down to the technological knowledge and expertise of 
just one individual.  Indeed, Jennings, as a character, blurs our understanding of guilt 
and innocence, offender and victim, villain and hero, making it difficult to determine 
whether the possession of ‘risk expertise’ is something which should evoke horror or 
hope concerning our protection.  
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The ability to sabotage, disable or circumvent different kinds of risk technologies is a 
pervasive feature of all of the films examined.  Minority Report, for example, not only 
includes the entrepreneurial character of a back street eye surgeon (discussed above), 
but the reliability of pre-cognition, it appears, can be circumvented from the ‘inside’.  
When Anderton eventually discovers that it is Lamar Burgess who has used his 
insider-knowledge of the ‘pre-cogs’ system to commit the ‘perfect’ murder, he 
confronts Burgess, and very publicly exposes the human fallibility of the scientifically 
infallible. While this may be viewed as just another commonplace narrative 
technique, there is something especially disturbing and unsettling when the ‘trusted 
insider’ turns out to be the source of the greatest danger and deceit.  It is an especially 
powerful trope which confuses our sense of where risk is located, and who or what we 
invest with our protection.  This kind of storyline, as it appears in a science fiction 
narrative – rather than, say, within the murder mystery – alerts viewers to the 
problematic claims of ‘risk knowledges’ which operationalise ‘risk’ in dichotomous 
ways, and which imagine its management as a zero-sum game between identifiable 
heroes and villains, and recognisable spaces of safety and danger (O’Malley, 2008).  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper set out to accomplish several inter-related things in an attempt to rethink 
the nature of public opinion about ‘risk’, its management and the technologies which 
claim to achieve this. I challenged assumptions about a ‘mass risk consciousness’ 
which presupposes a largely compliant and passive public who are not only receptive 
to the introduction of new strategies of risk-management, but who also actively 
campaign for and demand them.  However, there is very little work undertaken which 
starts from the premise of a public discourse which may be resistant to, or critical of, 
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or which at least has some reservations about the effectiveness of  systems and 
apparatuses of risk control.  It seems to me that as a point of departure, the idea of a 
critical publicity about ‘risk’ is a necessary component of functioning liberal 
democratic societies where the introduction and use of different models of risk-
management may raise a number of ethical and political questions about their 
implications to rights, justice, accountability and legitimacy.  Even so, deliberative 
democratic participation relies on more than town hall meetings and e-petitions; that 
is, we should be prepared to be relatively catholic in what we accept as ‘media of 
publicity’, and also what we regard as resistive practice.  Hitherto, such media have 
not included popular cultural forms, especially those which may be regarded as 
carnivalesque, even frivolous, such as comedy sketches, cartoons and blockbuster 
Hollywood cinema – even though mass marketed entertainment may have a much 
wider audience than any other form of ‘risk-engagement’ activity.  At the same time, 
relations of resistance need not be demonstrative or have a material impact to be 
effective.  Connolly’s (1999) notion of a ‘movement of becoming’ and an ‘ethos of 
responsiveness’ perfectly captures this sense of subjective and intersubjective 
resistance which is experienced as an existentially disturbing moment which unsettles 
our beliefs about ‘risk’ and its management, and incites a disruptive reflexivity about 
the received wisdoms of the ‘risk society’.  
 
Given its reputation as a medium of reflexive and destabilising cultural experiences, 
science fiction film constitutes an important counterpublic sphere through which risk 
discourse is re-presented and narrated.  Baudrillard’s notions of hyperreality, and 
Barthes’s concepts of jouissance and the enigmatic have been used here to inform a 
viewing/reading of science fiction cinema as a practice of critical publicity which 
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provokes a ‘movement of becoming’.  However, whereas formal, public discussion 
may centre on matters of impact, cost-benefits, levels and kinds of harm-
minimization, methodologies and technical inventions, film-going promotes a more 
open dialogue, even a conversation, in which our sensibilities to the ‘risk economy’ 
and ‘risk-reduction’ are being formed and reformed in the light of different 
possibilities and fictionalised imaginings.   
 
Science fiction film is invariably described as ‘futuristic’, and in the sense that stories 
are set at some future point in time, this is a reasonable characterisation.  However, it 
obscures the way that filmic futures are always-already embedded in the present.  Sci-
fi may appear to invoke a universe of fantastical forms, but on closer reading/viewing 
the genre centres on a range of suppositional narratives which raise questions about 
the scope and potentialities of actually existing risk technologies.  In this paper, I have 
argued that to view Minority Report, A Scanner Darkly and Paycheck is to experience 
a critical reflection on the language of science and its associated significations of risk 
technologies as infallible, reliable and objective, such that it is recognised as a 
powerful rhetoric which deflects attention away from the flaws, dangers and inherent 
weaknesses of different models and techniques of risk management – most especially 
the implications of the (inevitable) human involvement in abstract systems and 
apparatuses.  Through these films, viewers come to interrogate the politico-ethical 
relations of the ‘risk society’ in ways which may escape conventional deliberations.  
Questions of the means-ends justifications for the use of covert techniques; the nature 
of our relationship to each other in conditions of intensive surveillance; and our 
relationship to power and governmental authorities all feature as problematic aspects 
of human societies in which the management of risk has become the organising mode 
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of experience.  Moreover, ontological assumptions about what is or who are ‘risky’ 
are shaken at their core and in film, if not in life, categories and hierarchies of ‘risk-
producing’, ‘risk-free’ or ‘risk-prone’ environments and practices collapse, just as the 
boundaries between public and private and between state and civil society become 
blurred.  These kinds of existential ‘movements of becoming’ do not engender forms 
of resistance as material practice, but they do foster an ‘ethos of critical 
responsiveness’ which is not only ready, but is obliged to denaturalise the 
mythologies of the ‘risk society’. 
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